The Adam Smith Review Published in associalion with the Int€rndtional Adam Smith Socicty Edited by Viviennc Brown Facuhy of Social Sciences, The Open Unitetsitj, UK Book R€views Ediled b, Fonna Forman-Barzrlai Depa ment of Political Science, U iwsity of Califomia, San Diego, USA Editorial Board Ncil De Marchi (Depar(ment ofEconomics, Duke Universily. USA)i Stcphen DaNall (D.panmeni of Philosophy, Yale Uniwrsily, USA); Douglas Dcn U)l (Libeiry Fund, USA)I Samu.l Fleischacker (Depa(mcni ol Philosophy, Universily of lllinois, Chicaso, USA); Charlcs L. Griswold (Depa(ment of Philosophy, Boston Unive.sity, USA); Kmd Haakonlscn (Daarlment ofHistory University ofsussex, UK): Hiroshi Mizula (Japan Academy. Japan)i John Mullan (Depanment of E slish, Univemity College London. UK)i Takdhi Negishi (Japan Acadfly, Japan); Jamca ROtteson (Departm€nt of Philosophy. Y€shiva Univcrsity, New York, USA)i Nichola! Phillip6on (Dcpartnenl of History Unimity of Edinbursh, UK); D.D. Raphael (lmpenal College, London. UK): Ernrna Rothschild (Dcpartmenr of History Harvard Universitx USAi Kins\ College. Canb.idsc, UK)t lan Simpson Ross (Dclanment of English, Univcrsily of British Columbia, Canada)t Richard B. Shcr (Dcpartmenl ol Hhtory Ncw Jersey Institxte oi T@hnologyi Rutgc$ Universily, USA)i Andrew S. Skinner (University oiGlassow. UK); Kathryn Sutherland (S1 Anne's College, Oxford, UK): Keith Trib. (King's School, worester, UK); Cloria Vivenza (Dipartimento di Economie, Societ;, Istituzioni, University of vcrona, Italy); Donald winch (Gadute Retearch Cenlre in thc Hunanities, Univ€rsity of Sussex, UK). Books available in this series: The Adam Snith ReYi€w Volume 1 Edted b Vi|ienne Brawn (Published in 2004) Thc Adrm Smiah Review Volme 2 Edited by Vfiienne Brown (Published in 2006) The Ad{m Snith Revie* Edited by Vitienne Brown (Published in 2008) The Philosophy of Adam Snith The Adam Smith Review, volume 5: Essays comrnemomting tlrc 250th anniversary of The Theory of Moral Sentiments The Adan Smith R€view Volun€ 3 Edited bv Vivienne Brcwn and Edited b! Vivienne Brc\ln (Publish€d in 2007) Samuel FleLrchacket (Published in 2010) The Philosophy of Adam Smith The Adam Smith Review, volume 5: Essays commemorating the 250th anniversarv of The Theory of Morai Sentiments Edited by Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker !) Routledge IASS hneats , Btirish Jourot uI,{.rrrcl,.r,41. l18_59. t. \1912) The Role ol praridencc ih the Sacio! Oftlet: An Esay in rnteLte.tua! rrory, Princeton. NJ: Prineron University prcss. za, G. (2002) Adrn Snith ohd the Ctassi.s: The Ctnsicat Hetitqse in Adanitr'r ?ro!srr. Oxford: Oxford Unjversitv prcss 4lliez. C. (2006)'Doubte (af,dard natu;alty! Smirh and Rawls: a comparison of ll"ot ,:-t Y:l'".-*g ! schriesscr ;edr. Ner t/oi.?i on Ad;n ,mtth,ndoD and Nw York: Routledge. :..K (1959t Mar th. State tud wt Ncw yort Cotuhbia Unive$iry prers ek. N. (1984)'Tvo clncepts ot moEtiry: . dis(inction of Adam Smirh\ ethicsr 'l3 srorc on8rn . "Iorrnal rt he H$tot, ot ldeas 41 5al .604.t.S (11)&t Pollis Md yuion: Cutnu ! otd ttuojdrion in Weslcn potiricat orArr. Bosroi. MA: Liute, Brcwn and Company Resentment and moral judgment in Smith and Butler Alice MacLachlan How many things are rcquhiG to render the Brarification ol rcsentmenr cohpletely ag.!.able ... ? (rMS Lii.3.8) Introductiott Adam Smith expresses a fair amount of ambivalenc€ towards the passion of rcs€ntrnent. In the opening pages of fie Thegry of Mora! Senim;nl, he citcs it as a passion whose expression initially ,eicires do sort of sympathy, but ... selvelsl rarher to dhgusr and provoke us'(Smirh 1976, flts t,i,f.f). Ercn more than in other cases, ve must .b.ing home, th€ particularities of the resendul p€rson's circumstances and plovocation !o ou;sehes anil, in particular, we must figure out whether we sympathie with his antagonist's motives before we can possibly 'enter into' his emotional statc. Our sympathy with res€ntment is always indirect and secondary lndeed, resentment bclongs to the class of'unsocial' passions, alongside haked and spitei those emotions whose immediate effects arc most disagreeable to th€ specrator (1.ii.3.5). Thcre is thus almost no foreshadowing. in the opening pag€r of TVS, of tlre tolc resentment will com€ to play in part lI: Of Merit and Dem€rit. R€sentment reappcars therc as a fully-fledged moral sentiment, whose natural attributes are such that they successfully ground our moral judgments of demerit or blame, just as our natural s€ntiments of gratitude ground our judgments of merit or praise, Res€ntnent it would appea. has tecome This e$say is a discussion of the 'moralization' of r€sentment. By moralizatior, t do not refer to the complex process by which resentment ii transformed by the machinations of sympathy, but a prior chang€ in how the 'raw material' of the emotion itself is presented. ln just over fifiy pages, not only Smith's attitude towards the passion of resentrnent, but also his very conception of the term, appea$ to shift dramatically. What is an unpleasant, nsocial and relatively amoral passion of anger in general metamorphos€s into a morally and psychologically rich account of a cognjtively sharpened, Ti€ Philosophy ol Adan Snirh, The Adam Smirb R.viw. 5: l6l-t ?? @ 2010 The I.tematonal Adah smith sci.l, tssN '?41-5285, lsBN 9?8{_41t56256{. 162 Alice Maclachlan Dormatively Ladcn attitude, an attitude that contains both the judgment that the injury donc to me was unjusr and wrongful. and rhe de;and thar the offender acknowledge its wrongfulness.l Two very diffcrent readings of 'Smithian resentment' are thus available from the text. lndeed. rhe noti;n of two drstrncl lorm. ol reseotment an in.lincti\e. amoral version and a fich, rationally appraising attitude would bring Smith into line with an earlier account of r€sentment, found in Bishop Joseph Butler\ Fifieen Sennons Preached at Rolb Chapel. fir:t published in I?26. Ulrinareli I argue. rhe diflerences in their theories are !o Sm;th,s credit. It is precisely bcciuse the 'thin' or generic rctaliatory passion descdbed in pan I can be reconciled with th€ rich, normative attitude in Pa( lI, that Smith is able to accomplish his meta-ethical goal of grounding moral judgments in naturatty occuiring Resentme[t in The Theor] of MoruI Sentirrrents paft | When res€ntrncnt makes its first appearance in TMS, it does so as a completcly disageeable emorion, b€longing to a class of .unsocial passions' whose occurcnces ale unlikely to elicil sympathy from a spectato; Smith offers a couplc of reasons for our lack of sympathy with rcsenrment. In rhe firs! place, situations of resentmcnt ahvays prcsent two individual intercsts in conffict: 'our sympathy is divided berwe€n rhc person who feels [it], and rhe person who is the objecr of [ir]' (t.ii_3.1). As spectators, we rherefore nccessa_ dly lose a little of our potential passion to an opposin8 sympathy, at leasr until we are convinced that thc resentment is appropriate given iti occasion (provocation) and its intensity is moderate. We can accomplish this only by attempting and failing to sympathize with the motives ;f tle object of resentm€nt (the odginal offender). Sympathy with rcsentment always requires some reflection. But not even justified rcsentment can wholly capturc our sympathy; its 'immediat€ effects are so disagr€cable, that even when [it is] most justly provokcd, there is still something about [it] rvhich disgusts us; (r.ii.3.5). Smith conclr.rdes in Palt I that cven warranted. moderate resenrment presenls som€thing ofa chall€nge to our capacities fo. imaginative sympathy, aod its naturally unsympathetic nature should give us great pause b€fore wc endoNe any €xpression offt:'iherc is no passion, of whi€h the human mind is capable, conccming whose justness we ought to be so doubtful, conceming whose indulgence we ought so car€fully to consult our natural sens€ of propriety, or so diligem\r to consulr what wjll be the senrimenls of the ;ool and impartial spcctaror'. ln fact, thc passion of resentment is best rim,rldred: wc should resent more from a 'sense of the propdety of resentmcnt. from a sense that mankind expect and rcquir€ it oi ui' ttran because wc acarally eirperlercs the emotion (1.ii.3.8). Appropriate resentrnent h ali€nated reseniment; rather lhan a natulally occurring emotion, it is in fact the barest simu_ lacrum of one. Only once resentment has been lowcred in pitch, tested in Reseuhent and narul judgment 163 rcfledion and exprcsscd morc from guarded duty rhan anyrhing ehc, cdn \\e rendcr ll agrccable to a slrrnpathettc specktor Res€nbnent in The Theory of Mordl Sentiments p^rt Il Given.the vivid pjcture Smith paints ol resentment's disagreeable and funda_ mentally antisocial naiure in part I, it is surprising thar in parr II of TMa. resenlment lakes on a much morc signific?nt role in our moral psychotogy. and thar our symparhy wilh rcrcntmenr now becomes absolurely cruciallo our ability ro form judgments of moral demerit. In ran tt Smiit aaoprs agenerall) more balanced vrew of resenrment, pre.enring ir as porenrialll soci_ able rn narure. and capable of appearing symparhetrc ro ontookers. Unjer tne nghr condrtrons. we may 'heardly and enrircly sympaL\i7e wirh rhe resenl_ mentof the sufferci (II.i.4_4) so rhat our.owr anirnosity entirely correspoias,witl her own (11.i.5.8). Smith now acknowledge" tt ut u aenciency oi'.e"eni_ ment may b€ censured as wcll as ils excess: .we sometimes comilaln that ap.iniftlar.per\on shows too li le sprrir. and has loo lirrle sense oirhc injunes lhat have been done to him: and we are as rcady ro despise him for rhe dcfect, rs to hare him for rhc crcess ol thi, pajsion {1t...5.g). smllh rs not unaware of the apparent rncongruence ot lhese rwo picturcs ol resenthent, or thc common hesitation to grant resentment the siatus of a moral sentiment. Hc rcmarks: To ascribe in this manner our natuml sense of the ill dcserl of human altions to a sympathy with the resentment of the sutrerer, may seem, to the greater pa of peoplq to be a degradarion of tiut ieott neni Rcsentrnenl is.commonly rcgarded as so odious a pa(sron, rhat they wrl: be apt to lhrnk it impossible that so laudable a principle. as the se;se of the ill deserr of vice, should in any respect be founo.o,iir"l il., , , "",", Wary ol his audrence\ natural suspicion ot rcsenrmenr. Smift takes gr-ear carc ro dcvelop his accounl of rcsenrmenr a. a moral senLirnenr. ci'pable ol grcunding judgments of demerit, in a se;cs of small steps, and aiways in parallel wilh claim rhar judgments of mcrir are grounded in natural feetingi ot gmtitud€, 'because gratitude ... is regarded as an amiable principle, which-can take nothing lrom the wonh of whatcver js foundcd uion iti (ILi.5.7). He accomplishes this task in several slagcs. Smith's first step is !o note that d€merit is rhc quality of derer!,r?g punish_ ment. Bnt delermining that some$ing dese.r'es punishrncnt is to sa/no morr or less tlan that we do (or would) approv€ ofits punishmenl, or rather: that it is an approved or proper objcct of whatever it is that *ot;vates us to punish. At this point in the texr, Smith defines punishrnent as a tind of .."co*ieisJ,'lo rctum evij for evrl thar has b€m done.{U.i.L4). punrsbmcnt is nor'nec;s_ sanly a moral reaflion lo wrongdoing {and it includec rcvenge), bur approved 164 Alice MacLachtan or deserved punishment is So the second step is to move frorn the object of d€served punisbmmt to the object of a motive to punish which we can approve or, drawing on the materials of part I with which we ca! sympathize. Her€ Smith re-introduces resentment. Resentmcnt, he argues, is the only passion that directly motivates us to be the instument of another's misery {i.e. lo render evil ) 0l.i.l.5). Hau€d and dislik€ might lead us to w,s} misery on someone else, but unless we are exceptionally vicious, we do not also want to be th€ cause of that misfortune: tle 'very tlought of voluntarily conlributing' to such misery will shock us beyond all measure Resentsnent is the only passion to contairL necessarily, the desire tlat the object of out resentmenl suFer 'by our mean$ and upon account of that particular injury which he had done to us' 0li.l.7). The passion of res€ntment is what motivates us to punish otherE and so the third step of Smith's argument is to concludc lhat the object of dese cd punishment, that is, the object of an approved motive to punish, is also the proper object and thus the appropriate larget of our naturally occutring resentment, For this to carry explanatory weight, Smith must presumably draw on lhe picture of this naturally occurring passion already familiar to the reader from Part L ln the final stcp of his argumeni, Smith notes that the proper object of resentment is the object, or target, of proper lesentment: that is, of resentrnelt with which 'the heart of every impartial spectator sympathizes ... and evcry indifferent by-stander entirely ent€rs into, and goes along with' (ll.i.2.2). Thus for Smith, our judgments of demerit are ultimately grounded in our naturally occurring sympalhies with rcsenirnent both our o*n and oth€r people's. This is not a counier-intuitive account of retributivc judgments, bu i! is perhaps a litlle surDrising, givcn Smith's conclusion in TMS Part I: namely, tha! resentment is all but utterly unqmpathetic and what€ver symPathy we do achieve is an indirect consequmc€ o/no, sympathizing., tn fact, he remarkE our judgments of demerit are compound sentimentsr composed both of our dir€ct antipathy to the lnon' 6 of the perf,etmtot and our resulting indirect sympathy with the r€sentment of the sufferer. One might think that Smith could skip ovcr the problem of sympathizing with resentment altogether, and develop an account of demerit from the impropriety of the perpetrator\ motives, deduced by our failure to sympo,thize with those motive& and an objective assessment of the resultant harm to the victim. Inde€d, wEre Smith !o account for judgments of deme;t in the manner jusr skctched, he would have emerged as far morc of a pmro-utilitarian than he does. But Smith expressly avoids groundin8 our sense ofdemedt and injustice in g€neral assessments of social harm or utility in llii.3.,f-s, focusing instead on'that consciousness ofill-deserf which'nature has implanted in the human breast': namely. rcscnrment (ll.ir.3 4, Smith takes res€noncnt to be crucially important to molaljudgment and indeed, to political and legal institutions ofpunishment. At first, resentment\ importance appea$ to be a matter of utility: 'the natural gratification of this Resehhent akd moral judgment 1 passion.rends, of its oir.n accord, to produce all rhe political ends of punir T:r.ttl Lhe _ congcrlon of rhe criminal, and the exanple to the populatir 0li.l.6), but Smith paints a much morc vivid piciure ot the'innedit propri€ty of punitive resenhenl prior ro any consid€rations of uril;ty, wh describing a murder viclim: His blood, we think, calls aloud for vengeatce, The very ash€s of t d€ad seem.ro be disturbed ar the rhoughr that his injur;s are to p: unrevenged. ... Naturg antecedent to all rcfi€ctions ulon the utility punishment, has in rhis manner stampcd upon the human heart. in t strongest and mosl indelible characrcrs. an rmmedrarc and insiinclr approbation of the sacrcd and neccssary law of rctaliation. 01.i.2. In tying judgments ofdemeril so closely to our desire to punish, cxpressed the naturally occuning passion of resentment, Smith argues thar m;ral iud menrs ol demerit conrarn a morivational elemenr. necessarily shared by ihr who make the judgmentJudgmenls of btame have action-guiding properri, and these explain how I,e come to have a sense ofiustice. ;€cessa; fo; socj mechanisms of retriburive justice. Furthermorq resentments of any kind, wheth€r proper or imprcp contain a desire for dccrtmtability and acknowtedgemenr frorn rbe wrongdot that she be made to grieve on account of hcr behavior.rr towards m-e_ t resmrer: nol only that he shoutd bc pudshcd. bur rhar he should be punish, by our means, and upon account of that particular injury which he had dor to us'(ILi.l.6). Sympathy with tlat resentment is, at the same rime, appro! of that demand for acknowledgement. Our judgmenS ofdemcrit, as implir g€stures9f such sympathy, ar€ thus also judgments of respect towar the victim of wrongdoing, as they acknowledge her claims in wals that i alErnarive, utilrtarian roure ro demerir would noL. Two Resentments in The Theory of MoMl Sentimentsl The account of moral judgments presented in paft II of the TMS describ€s as experiencing, when we rcscnt, a normatively lad€n, moralized retributi emotion. Smitht description will be familiar ro those ,aquainted wi contempomry philosophical discussions of resentmenr, for example pet Strawson's description of resentnent as a panicipant reactive attitude (200: Jeffrie Vurphy 12003) and Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Harnpron! (1988) defen, of resentment as a virtuq and rccent treatmcnts by Cha es Criswold (200 and Thomas Brudholm (2008) among others. Not everytling we ordinari describe as resentrnent, for exampl€, can meet this account a;orc lechnica rarefied defnition is required.3 Does Smith provide such an appropriate technical dcfinilion in his inirial description of rhe passion? The answer both yes and no. tn facr, it\ possible to read ttre iVS as presenting tr 166 AIie Maclachlan entirely separate accounts of resentmcnr, only one of which me€ts the standard demanded by contemporary philosophical heatments of resentinent. This is, for examplq the reading offered by Stephen Daruall.a On rhis reading. we can understand Smith to use 'resentment, loosely at first, as nothing more than a rough synonym for ange. Later in par! lI, when it becomes necessary to_€xplain how certain kinds of angry reactions are capable of grounding fully-fiedged moral judgments, he focuses on a richer. more sympathetic. cognitively sharpened, attitude. The s€cond alternative is to argue that Smith uses resenttnent consist€ntly to describe a single psychological state, bul that his discussion in Part II draws out aspects or implications of that staie left dormant in Part L This inlerpretation requires that we square the rich, normatively laden properties of what I have called Smith,s moraliz€d resenhenr and what Darwall calls 'second-personal resentmeni' with the thinner, un_ momlized account of natumlly occurring resentment Smith provides in part ll. Whilc ev€ntualiy I intend to defend the second alternative, ;nd to argue that a full understanding of the moraliz€d resentment of part Il recognizes it as the culrnination of Smilh's earliet non-moral rcsentment and not as a separate if rclatcd psychological state, it is important to establish just how much Smith's pr€sentation of resentmenr changcs" ln the opcning sections of the TMS, Smith uses .rcsentment, interchargeably with'anger','fury','ourage'and'indignation'(I.i.t.?, Li.4.6, t.i.5.a). Hc do€s not consistently rcserve one term for moderate instances ofthe others. or thosc in"lance, $hich dn independent lhird pa y could rccognize as having becn Jusrified by (appropriare to) the acr that provoked rhem_ Smith notes these arc passions we sharc with children and with .brutes' (Lii. 1.3), and rhat they are passions apt to seiz€ hold of and dislort our reason, rather lhan remaining s€nsitive to it. Sometimes!'rcsentment' contains the expressed desire for reverge or retaliation (though the desired ac! does not appear to be a fully-fiedged retibutive responsc, as warranted punishment might be), and at other times it is litde morc than an instinctive angry reaction. Neither is one anger-tetm the genus of which others are thc species. Much later in the TMS, when criticizing Hutcheson's moral sysrem, Smith alludes in passing to 'emotions ol particular t r/s' whose gcneral features arc consistent even while subject to variation, and he mentions anger/resentment as one such generic kind (Vu.iii.3.l3). The term ttrus scems to rcfer ro a family of retaliarive states. Clearly, Smith's descriplion ofresenrmcnt in Part It is much more elabomre. while he continu€s occasionally to swap the terms'resentment,,.anger,and 'indignation'(11.ii.2.3, lliii.l.l). rcsentm€nr is now rhat sentiment which not only dir€ctly prompls us to punish, but also wishes evil (punishment) to the wrongdoer by our means, on account of our injury and in such a way that he be made to suffer grief, repcntance and regrer for thar injury (and nor simply .cgret at having experienced the puishmenr). ln otler words" the passion of resentmenr row contains the wkh that the perpetrator come to feel towads thc original injury in jusr the same way rhai \ve do, that hc now share Resentnent ad norul judgment 161 our attitude. The suffici€ni conditions for resenting someone have riscn drarnatically. We cannot makc sensc of this textual shift by insisting that rcsentmcnt in Part II is simply whar Smirh rnlended by propci resenl,nenr in pan I; whar I havccalled moralized resenrmenr is no( a modcrare, appropriarely occurrinp v€rsion of'thin' or gencric resentment. In the initial passages on iesenrmentl Smilh speaks ofproper or sympatbetic rescntment, lrlrt as a moraliz€al versio, of the general passroD, containing an explicidy rnoraj claim about wmngfuj rnjury but rather as a verbally and behaviourally moderare instance of il Proper rcsent-rnent is fury held in check (Lii_3_8). There is Iinle or no allusion to the kind of desire for accountability descibcd in part lI, where to resenl someone ist at the same time, ro wish to ,bring him back to a morc just sense of what is due to other peoplq to make him scnsible of what he owes us, and of the wrong h€ has donc us' (Il.iii.l.6). ln parr lt, rhe cri!€ria for what qua. lifies as resentmcnt have not only riscn but have also .hanged in na].flt;t ft reseot is (o wish specific things rcgarding rhe wrongdoer's adtudes and no1 simply his (mis)fortunes. Prcper resentmenr, in part l, is that resentrnenl which is justiied and modemte. Rcsmtment in Part lI can be both iustified and unjustified: we can be wrong about what transpired or who rs resionsibte for our wrongdoing we can wish a chang€ of atlitudc on tlrc wrontperson, or under the wrong circumsrances. Darwallt claim that Smith appears to bc discussing a new psychological state alrogether is far from implausible. Furthermore, in Parr II, resentment has becn recast as a sociable attitude. in at least two senscs: first, we can resenr sympathetically with orhcrq o. on their behalf, as well as our own. Second, in resenting, we d€mand something from the p€rpetrator a change in her attitudes ResenL.nent thus represc;b an ongoing emotional engagement with he.: again, a morc sociable attitude than is presente{ in Part I. R€sentrnent in Butler's Fifreen Sermons Were Smith to identify rescntment as a broad emotional category containjnC both moralized and non-momlizcd versions, he would nor be the fnt. That is exactly the account of resentmcnt off€red in Bishop Joseph Butler.s F,ree, Semons Prcached at the Rolk Chapel (1949 [1126]). There is not an exrensive literature exploring Butler's influence on Smith's understanding of resentment although Griswold notes that's€ve!a1 ofthc points Smith makes aboul anger or resentmcnr' including a crucial distinction b€tween moral and non_ moral resentment, are anricipared in Burl€r's Se'noru (Griswold 1999: I l7).5 D.D. Raphael and A.L Macfie limit Butlerl influence on Smith !o the 'unconscious repetition of phrases' in rhef introduction to TMS (19?6: I l), Nhile a rcccnt paper by James Hanis sugg€sts that Smith's afrnity and debt to Butler has been generally undcr-appreciated (Hanis 2008: l5). Rcsentmeni presents a slightly different puzzle for Butld rhan it does for Smith. He opens his sermon on resentment by asking: ,Why had man 168 Alioe MacLachlah implanted in hirn a principle, vr'hich appears the direct contrary to benevolence?' (Butler 1949: 121). On the on€ hand, rcsentment can't be writlen off, since'no passion God hath endued us with can be in itselfevil' (122), but at the same time r€s€ntment does not appcar to be good, either ils object (the misery of another peEon) appears directly contrary to the duty of b€nevolencg and to the Christian pr€cept 'love thine enemies'. He is even prepared to allow that rcsentment 'is in every instance absolutely an evil in itself, becaus€ i! implies producing misery' (139). Yet, resentment is a natuml passion, and 'natural' for Butler carries normative forc€, as it implies Godgiven.6 Ultimately, Butler argues for the compatibility of moderate res€ntment with both benevol€nce and his admittedly minimalisr reading of Christian forgiven€ss, but it remains in his text a 'painful remedy' to the fact of injury and violence, and is subject to excess and abuse.? we n€ed the passion of resentrn€nt to correct for what would otherwise be motivational defcienciesl namely, our ability to punish and deter wrongdoing but it would be better if offenders were brought to jusrice through the cool consid€rations of reason and reflectior alone (131). 'What, according to Butler, do w€ mean by resentment? According to his se(mon on the topic, 'resentment' represents both a genus and a sp€cies of emotion and again, his dislinclions are complicated by the fact that he occasionally exchanges the word 'anger' for 'resen!men!'. Hc divides gen€ric rescnment (generic anger) into two kinds: (l)'hasty and suddcn' anget also known as passion, and (2) 'settled, deliberate' resentment. Hasty anger is morally indifferent, instinctive and often irmtional; Butlcr compares it to blinking something out of one's eye. It is experienced by infanis and animals as well as adults and from lhis Butler concludes it cannot be the etrect of reason, but is excited by 'merE sensation and feeling' (lz) g Butler spends a great deal morc time tackling the problematic phenomenon of settled. deliberate resentmcnt. Becaus€ even miional, reffective peopl€ can experi€nce rescntment, it must be the effect of reason, he argues, but th€ only way rcason could raise any anger is to represent not just harm, but injustice or injury ofsomc kind. The object of r€seniment is thus not su{Tering or harm p?/ re, but moral evil (126). The very cmotion of (settled, deliberate) resentment always contains the belief that the object of my resentment has behaved unjustly, and has caused an injury of some kind. This is €vid€nt' Buder sugges6 from thc considerations likely to rais€ oa lower our resentment: whether the act was performed by d€sign or was inadvertent' whether the offendcr yielded to strong temptation or acted v,/ithout provocation' whether a prior friendship offers evidence of the offendert other rcdeeming qualities, and so on that is, moral consideralions conc€ming the wrongdoer's motives and hcr chalactcr (126). Butlcr concludes that settled r€sentm€nt is'plainly connected with a scnse of virtue and vice, of moral good and evil' (125): that is, it is always already moralized. In fact, he uses the moralized nature of resentment as evidence against psychological egoism: 'why should men dispule conceming the realily of virtue, and whether it be fourd€d in the nature Resenme t and oral judghent 169 of things ... when cvcry man carries about him this passion, which affolds him demonstration, that the rulcs ofjustice and equity arc to be lhe guide of his actions?' (l3l). Setded resentment is cartainly not morally infallible; Butler provides a long and rather wonderful discussion of its various excesses and abuses, including malic€ and r€venge In fact, while raised by Eason and nominally sensitive to reason's claim\ resenbnent also has 'a certain detetmination and r€solute b€nt of mind not to be convinced or s€t right'(129). We should thus be wary of resentment's ability to latch on and take hold. Budeis cautions regarding rescntment rcsonate with Smith! admonition that we resent more fiotn a distanccd sense of its pmpriety than because we have actually succumbcal 1o jts charms (fMS 1.ii.3.8). Luckily, though, the abuses of resentmcnt are primarjly limited to our owD, pe$onal grudges: thos€ resentments arising from injuries to ourselves, or those whom w€ consid€r as ourselves (Butlcr 1949: 126). Impartial rcsentment or indignation in other words, a spectator's resentmcnt is tllus an appropriate standard for measuring partial res€ntmcntl the victim ought 'to b€ afrected towards the injurious person in the samc way any good men, uninterested in the casc would be, if they had ihe same just sensq which we supposed the injured person to havc, of the fault' (Butlcr 1949: 143) that is, if they are impa(ial and we -informed. Smith rs. Butler on moralizing r€scntment Butler oudin€s two distinct forms of resentnert or anger; a thin, instinctive reaction to harm of any kind and a rich, moralized attitude that taryets only our perc€ptions ofinjustice and injury The latter is expr€ssly identified as the origin ol our motive to punish, and is 'plainly conn€cted' with our 'sense of virtue and vjcg'. Furthermore, we evaluate th€ latter emotion with refercnce to the standard of an impartial bystand€r.e Can we make s€nse of the apparent inconsistency in Smithian rcsentment by reading Butler's two kinds of resentment into the text ofTMS? lf so, the discussion ofresentmenl in Par! I could be und€rstood as a discussion of sudden, hasty anget ot more plausibly, of anger/resentment in general, containing for th€ time being both hasty, sudden anger and settled, deliberate resentmenl, so that we can better undentand our judgments of propiety towards botl, kinds as ihey naturally occur in everyday life. Part It, on the other hand, focuses on the salient kind, namely s€ttled, delibemte res€ntment, because it is a discussion of moral judgments of demerit and these judgments are concemed with fte proper objccls of deliberate resentmenlr injuslice and wrongful injury. This Butlerian account is a t€mpting interpretation ofsmith, but in the end it is not convincing; moreovet adopting il does not do Smith's moral psychology any favours. There are both textual and philosophical reasons to resist a reading that sharyly sepamtes tlrc 'resentments' discussed iD Parts I and II. First of all, Burler simply asserts what Smith attempts to dcmonstrate: that we can lrace a path from lesentm€nt as we ordinarily experience it to our 17O Alice Macla.hlan cognitively sophisticated judgments ofgood and evil, merit and demorit. Butler starts out by announcing, 'resenlment is of two kinds' (Butler 1949: 123). In doing so, he has both ditrerenliated and connect€d sudden and deliberate angcr. His claim is that among our natural experiences of angry feelings, there is a particular kind that always already contains claims of moral wrong. ln helping himself to an already momlized attitudg Butler makes the con, nection between natural r9s€n(mcnt and a sens€ ofjustice far easier to provq but pcrhaps less interesting to contemporary audiences unconvinced that the moral and the natual arc so easily reconciled, as a result. lf the goal is to demonstrate our essentially morai nature by demonstrating how moral claims are grounded in our Datural emotional reactions to the world, then surely ihe interesting question is whethcr we can pick out a 'natural' (in the sense of non-moral) sub-class of angry feelings that are also easily distinguished by an overdy moral claim. Picking out just those reactions that can be developed into moral judgmentr for no other rcason that lhese are the reactions lhat can be d€veloped into moral judgments, app€ars at least to the observer not alr€ady convinced of the thesis to be worryingly clrcular. Furthermore, it seems fairly obvious that we experience more kinds of ang€r/resentment than instinctivq irrational episodes of lashilg out and oveftly moralized resentmen! we rcsent individual acts of molal injury yes, but we may also resent other threats to and burdens on our wellbeilg, at least ac{ording to everyday understandings of lhe word. We caD r€sent the demands of a difrcult and unrewarding job or a demanding. draining relationship; we can resent f€elings of disappointmcnt or \rulnembiliry. We may r€s€nt others for failing to live up to our expcctations, or for their €xpectations of us criswold gives the example of a painful, persistcnt dis€asq ovcl time my reaction to it might at least leel likd resentment (2007: 22). Margaret Walker notes that wc resent disruptions to a wide variety of social and political norms as well as the overdy moral, and our resentment is sometimes inflected with fear, snvy and a variety of anxiety (2006).10 IfButler mcant his distinction to be exhaustivq his taxonomy is startlingly incompletq and his psychology less comp€lling as a result. lf hc is singling out only those instances th&t are independently, recognizably moral and those tha! are most obviously no, moral (an instinctive reaction to harm), then his use of resentment as a passion that comes in moral and non-moral form. as €videncc of our moral naturq is susp€ct. Finally, Buller leav€s us with little sense of bow our mlional 'deliberate' reseniment is relaied to inslinctive arger. He certainly do€sn't provide a gen€tic or developm€ntal account of how the moralized passion €fierges from the non-moral; rathet it is divinely 'implanted' in us. ln conhast, one of the gr€at strengths ofTMS is how carefully the moral distinctions and categories of its subsequent parts a.e built using only thc materials of Part I: our lr6tura] impuls€s and emotions, social and unsocial, and the capacity for imaginative sympathy that links us to one another lt is unchamcteristic for Smith to develop the conditions of propri€ty for one psychological state in Part I, then Resenunent atd nmral judgment 17l switch terms lo an entirely difrcrent state and indeed, a normatively laden one in Pan II, without explaining how these stat€s ar€ related, or how the emotion in Part lI camc to bc so r€adily laden with apFropriate normative claims, Thus, a Butl€rian account ol resentment is a pifall that Smith would do well to avoid and indeed, one that he does avoid. Thc discussion of resenrment in Part Il is not jus! a story of how to derive moral judgmcnts of dem€rit from a moralized version of natural resentment; it is a story of how resenunent l€nds itself to mo8lization. ln Part ll, Section III, when Smith discusses the 'irregularity' of our r€sentments and our gratitude, he simultaneously takes us through the stages of resentrnent's shift frcm initial, instinctive emotional retaliatjon to cognitively sharpen€d demands for accountability. This is no! onlv a story of propriety; it reveals how the raw emotion of rcsentment develops, apart from and prior to any intervenlions of sympathy, First, Smith notes that all animals resent any cause of pain, whelher the cause is animate or inanimate: 'we are angry for a momcnt, cven at fie stone that hurts us A child beats it, a dog barks at ir, a cholcric man is apt to cuse it' GMS U.iii.l.l). For lational creatures, a little reflection corrccts this general response, at l€ast in most cases. We realize, Smith notes, tha! 'before anything can be th€ proper object of gratitude or resentment, it must not only be the cause of pl€asure or pain, it must likewis€ be capabte of feeling them'; and his use of'before' rather than 'in order' is absolurely crucial, here. This is not a statement about attitudinal propri€ty ground€d in sympathy, but rather a'prccondition' of sorts. The proper objects ofresentment must be capable of feeling pain, so that ow resenhe t can be fu f satisfed, not so others can sympathize with it. The latter is a separate, later question. And so Smith continues. Animals are bettcr, but not perfect or 'complete' objects of res€ntnent, as there is something missing or wanting in our resentment of animals: we camot demand recogition from them; we cannot brinS lheir attitudes to the original harm in line with ou! own. ln otler words, we can't get satisfaction. To be a truly satisfactory objcct of resentment! our antagonist must have caused our pain, be capable of feeling pain heffell and have caused ov pain ftom desigu that is, from the kinds of mental faculties rcquired for trs to charye her mind about her actions (Il.iii.l.4). Only then will we attain what is" Smift argues, the real aim of our resentmenl to have the object of our res€ntment, the offender, experienc€ the sam€ painful attitude towards the injuiy that we cun€ntly feel and, in so feelinS, acknowledge its status as a wrcngful injury The vengeful aspect of res€ntrnent desir€s a panicular klrd of misery for ils objecl 'rcsentmcn( cannot be fully gratified, unless the offender is not only made to grieve in his tum, but to grieve for that particular wrong which we have suffercd from him' (I1.i.1.7).rr Smith is able to claim, in Part II, that resentment contains a demand for acknowledgement because that acknowledgement emerges as part of the retributivc dcsire, sk€tched in Part L l7Z Alice MacLachlarl What st kes mc in thh developmental story is that Smith is conc€med to identify the shift, not simply from instincrive to p/op€l resentment, but also from instinctir,€ to rc/rf,tir8 resentment. He is idenrifying rhe .complere, or 'perfecf objects of onr resentmenr complete from thestandpain; oJ that rcsentmeht its intemal logic, as it vrere. In doing so, he painti a picture of how resenlmen( moraliz€s itself on its own terms what ciswold calls ils propensity to tell a jusrifying story abour itself (200?: 30). rath€r rhan m€rely introducing a moralized version of a naturally amoral sentiment. This deveiopmental story makes Smitht account psychologically morc insighttut rhan Butler\, and ultimately allows him to ground genuinciy moral claims of merit and d€merit into what fiIst seemed to be a decidediy non_moral asp€ct of our Psychologies. Conclusiom At first glanc€, Smitht account of resenrment in The Theorv of Moml .Sprrmearr seems to suffer from an unlo(unate inconsisrency. pertap, evcn an ambjguity, in the rcfer€nt of lhe central term. He app€a$ to conffatssevcral emotions under a single heading, lailing ro approp alely disringuish them, as done in an earlier trcatment of resentnent by Joseph Butl€r. In fact, this apparent inconsistency is evidenc€ of a much richer and more nuanced moral psychology of retributive atritudes, which pays significant and much_needed attenlion to the ph€nomenology and satisfaction of our resentments. borh instinctive and'moraliz€d'. It is because. and not in spile of, the variation in Smith\ description of resenlment, that he is able to employ it as the gmunding for judgrnents of demerit and injustice. I havc focused on a key differ€nce in ihe accounts of resentment Drovided by Adam Smirh and Joseph Burier. While rt is temprrng ro read boLh phitosophers as using a single term 'resentmenr' to describe two distinct, ifrelared, emotional states, this temptation would be an unfortunat€ misrepresentation of Smith on resentment. It may app€ar that Smith presents two entircly diff€rent versions of rcsentnent in Pa(s I and Il of the TMSj in fact, the narrower! more overtly normative artirude described in part II develops naturally out the natural reactive instinct presented in part l, acconling io what I have callcd res€ntmentt 'intemal logic'. There is a grcat dcal more to be said about the alinitics betwcen Smith and Butler on r€sentment than is covcrcd in this essay. Certainly, in praising Smith\ developmental story of rescntment at Butler\ expense, I havc nor done justice to some of thc remarkable srrengths of Butler\ account. These slrcngths include Butler's cmphasis on the sociability of r€sentment. that is. our abil y ro cxperience vicarious resenrmcnt {rndignatton) on behalf of othe$ and tlle moral expectations we place on off€nders in resenting them. Butler also illustrates how we exercise our capacity for sympath€tic, imagi" native engagemen( with the emotional lives ofothers in navigating our own; we Ieam to curb our resentment to appropriate lcvcls (and indeed, even to forgive) Resentuent and moraljudgmmt 173 by training ouGelves to 'be affecred towards the injurious person in the same way any good men, rminlerested in the case, would be'(Butler 1949: I43). lmpartial third parties play a key role in assessing .proper, resentment in Butler\ sermonq as they do in Smith the wide moral community is rhus invoked, even in intcrpersonal instances of wrongdoing. In fact, Butlei anticipatcs Smith by drawing L-ey connections among resentment. on the one handand mont iudgmcnr. rerributi!ejusricc and lhe delence ofmoral norms. on the olhcr. And Butlcr\ analysis of rcsentment extends bcyond Smith's in his elaborate discussion of forgiveness alongside resentment. In this manner. Butler indicates how rcsentrnent plays a rclc. nol onl) rn rc(nbution, but also rn rccolcrlialror Furtbermorq it might appear that in focusing on the 'raw matcrial, of res€ntmentj I have missed the import of Smitht account. For Smith. the true 'moralization' of any emotion, social or unsocial, takes place tbrough the complex psychological mechanism of sympathy. tl is in symparhizing ;r fail_ ing to sympathize with the motives and reactions of others that wc Jevelop a sense of tieir propriety or impropriety. Ultimatelt any exp€rience of resent_ ment, whether instinctive or cognitiv€ly laden. is judged appropriatc or in_ appropriate accordiq to whether or not an imparrial ana wil-lnlormea spectator would symparhize with it. Yct Smith is not interested in r€sentment for matte$ of emotional propriety alone. In Pan lI, proF\er resentment is the narural, afiective ground for our moral judgmcnts of demerit. Resentment is one of .the great safe-guards of the association of mankind, to protect the w€ak, to curb the violent and to chastisc th€ guilry' GMS Il.ii.3.4). h also repres€nts our .narural s€nse of ih€ propricry and fitness of punishment' GLii.3.?). Smith is relucranr ro granr rhar justice is a matter of mere utility; rathcr, our sens€ of justice is harrla1, grounded in that natural sentim€nt which animates us to abhor .fraud, perfidy, and injustice, and to delight to see rhem punished' (ll.ii_3.9). lr therefo;e matters significantly to Smith's proj€ct that the normatively laden reacrive attitude capablc of grcunding our retributive judSments and molivations ir Pan lI can be found among the natural passions and emotions describcd in Part ll. The texl of TMS revcals a consist€nt, sophisticated account of the passion of resentinent. Moreover, Smith's analysis is significant for contemporary discussions of resentment. ln contemporary philosophical lit€ralure on retriburion and reconciliation, resentnent has come to stand as the retributive reactive altitude par excellence.t2 As a result, the story philosophers tell about resentment iis distinctive features, aimq rationality and gratification will aff€ct the conclusions we draw about which actual angry experiences to take seriously as rcsenhents. Contemporary philosophers have typjcally argucd for a naffow, technical account of rescntrnent, in order that this moral attitude can be dis_ tinguished from the wide range of angry feelings we may experience in everyday life, few of which can be articulaled as anything close io a moral demand. Resentment, rhcy arguq is moralized anger; orjust that anger which onebl, at least prima facie, ro bc lak€n seriously. 174 Alice Macla.htnn . Yet it is quite possible that limiting thc scope of morally significant ang€rs does a further injusticc to those with the most reason (o feel r;ge As fem;isr scholars like Alison Jaggar have noted, under hierarchical conalitions of social in€quality in which dominanr values will lend to service rhe interest of dominant groups, those mos! burdened by th€ status quo may final themselves experiencing 'outlaw emotions': emotional reactions that ire dismissed by others precisely because tiey calnot be r€construded as r€cognizable mor;l claims, at ldast according to the framework operating in a p;tjcular moral conmunity (2008i 3l). The exampte Jaggar offers of an outlaw emorion is resentmenl (in this case, resentment ar,kindnesses, which are actuallv subtlc expressions of oppre\,ive power-rclalion,hips). In di<rrnguishrng sharply b€tween 'moralized' and non-moralized angcrs, philosophers -"y t "-p".themselves from focusing on morally significant angers in this case. re;is_ tance to oppression that cannot cu.rrently be adculated as moral claims. Smith, on the other hand, is prepared not only to connect our moral judgments of injustice and wrongdoing to our natural emotioDal reactions of fts€ntment, but also, to allow for the possibility that the moral atlirudes grounding these judgments are not so different from many other kinals of anger we typically cxpe.ience. Acco.ding to the Smithian .story, ofresentrnent, our natural passions are subject to thc influence of fortune (both individual and socialr and are \uln€rable to lhe symprrhy or lack ofslmpathy. we rc.eive from others amund us These contingent features ofour social iontext may well influencc how even our best reflection is able to corrcct and curb our immediate and instinctive angry rcacrions to the world. Smith gives us more room, and more rcason, to take seriously angers that contempomry philosophical accounts cannot. ID refusing to distinguish absoLrtely between narroq 'mora'ized' resentment and a'wider knge of our insrinctivE angry reactions _ indeed, by illustrating how beauiifully thc former aises our oathe distincrive aims and features of tlrc later Adam Smith may well be an important auy for critical scholars wishing ro broaden the range ofsocial angen we ought to takc s€riously. Acknolrledgements I am grateful to James Harris and to Eric Schliesser for their help in putting together this essay, and especially to Samuel Fleischacker and Viviennl Brown, for their insightlul editorial assistance. Notes I I borcw the term tosnirively sharpened'f.om D,Arm$ and Jacobson (t993). 2 The idea thar jdgnenrs ot demcrir (or blane) ae Lrounded in our narurat ani, rudes of r$cnimcnr ha( been rakcn up b) d nrmbcr o'conremDor.rv Dhitosooh.rs mosr nor.bly in Percr Srra{:on! .Freedom and rcsenhent (2001r.' 1Increrydaylife,\c$nrmmt may dsib€ many d'frernr k inds of anger or !a, and may be used inrerchangeabty with indignatron. irrirarion. fru.rration.-begrudgemenr. Resentment and morat judghent I.t5 Jis re!s. conlempl. ha$ed. natre. ,Lha.tpnt,eu(1c venCeiutncs:. \rndicduon andra8e, amons orheri 4 lnS'epntr Darwa ! phnary Nesron ar ,the phrtosophy or Adam Smirh.{Datualliuuq). rc_de.cribs smi,h as .connarins r"o psycrrrilii,;, iiJi"il.;#il#i :1i"s::",trT1,"1..:,rJn.nr. Rerarrarory r6enhc",,*k" ",""8;.i ;:,;;wnlje second-personal resenrmeol \cc[s not ro e.ilact "r.,h"onender bur ro hotd hcr as,e,,are ana rrus conrains a r;_;;i p?;pJ;.g"i;;;rhc person who has injured me ReratiaroN lPs€nln.nr i, p.""^."ui, a*&La.t,pdrt I of TMS. whitc second-penondl i".enr.enr c,.,gcs In the dscussiong' l.T rr ,l" r zreue in * s c,vy. r am nor convinccd rh juh;..;;;";;#';iyans I and It arc as separabtc as Dapa a ows. bur I rak h" p.i"i-;;;; ;;;';;ior Pi'r I iq rctJhdr.on. wh,rc rhe rocu. .r p..r rr r. .ec.;n1;;; ;; :Ji;ili:edgemcnt (Daryall 2006 178_Ror 5 G.i$-old aho.a udes ro Smn{ werat timcs, in his disrussion of Burtcr on, re\entmrnl and rorgpcncsc (Cr.s$otd 2007 22-81. n ro rhis norhd ve torce ar Butter\ tbcotogicat reteotoSy ? Aeddrng ro Burts. to for8ile rc ro pe,ccivc one: q|lngdoer and her acronsvrrhorl the disroflins cfi-<rs of panrahy and \etr_tolc *d:;;-; ;;i ,;;;,:ene a moderarc rc$nrmmr. no morc than whar.any sood -;, ;;i;,";;,"'Ji;llre case $ourd reer ( r4r I we mu< ronsear rcvcree. b,; "", ;ii;;.;;;;.ililsi 'n order ro for8rve. Forgiveness 6 comDarible menr, rrris acnnrr;on oi io"lil;-i;ll,;:,-lfJT:i1..""tr,1;:1,"j.,ffj phc!r accounts. ,n\tudinB rho.e who ctarm ro r"l. s,rrcr ". itc".l;si;,i",r'nsp'rition (Mlrphy and HamDton lg8i: M,,lvej; Hicrcnymi 2001r rph' 2001: Habe l9oli Holm&m 8 Crivold nores lhar Burter di\rdes resenhent borh by dur.r,on, $herher suodcn orse,'red. and by ils objccr. rhar s harm or in.uq ,zorjr, r:, s". ,l-ili ."#."iisudden an8.r thar is insrincrrvc and non-moial, and rs ocq,r.""d b; h;;3;i.;can also e\prnene ludden aoral anr€r. rhal s otrarid..a r." ,"r, u,,,,1-i,^,1ooes slss$r he ,hints mmar anse! ,or rsenrn'en,, ca" r.,,f0"" .i ,"""ri l,ir"i,lor derrbe'te but ir apF@6 rhar rhe cruciat d*rincrion fm ht;;;;j;,io;l';;i :lc 9!Fc' a.nd o'isin oran8e! rB-rrer rq,{o. rr"i il;:;,;;;rfi;;.-ti'b:i';;Jlrhe rrnd ol anger rrrar comes rrom insrrncr ,nd t occas,oned by "d hr*-.i;.rrcm rhe kind of anser rhdr comes rrom ,e""on ""d u"d",",a"iti"s: ;; ;;;"1$oned b rhe ,ded or rnju\r(r or inru,.]. ,r am lpeak,ns "r ,h" f";;? *;* r;;,n i\ ro be d,(rrn8-shcd rrom rhe'taricr. ,*;,, ";, * *i,iJiiJ"i il#i--iundtrsundins can Eise angrr is by repEsentins ro oui .i"a ;iuyi"" - ;","* "isore knd, o, o(hei r 124 ) rtus. I rocus or rhe i,srinc"* ,r,i, e;,t;i h; "ir ijril a Tllere is a c€nain affin(y betwcn Smrthb rmagc ot a minor and B rter\susse\rion rhar '$c are in rlch a pecutirr siruarion. ;irh .,*l;; ;;,;;;:.;^::l:ouffh.s. rhar$e cdn sca,(,,,v ;"'.*. rr,., ".,r,.i i;;it;".,h;,ffii;il;; s€e irs.lf (auder t949: t,t4). ln wal"er gre, an rmples(tr. hu or resenrmenrs nor provok€d b) pereondt mor"lrn ury r,ue rhc rcknotrledgcr wc rsenr r,u,rrrr _o ro*... lur ioin" p"Jor.'ui_Rsenr (heaters and free nders (ecn shen we do nol sutrer as a mq,rrr'rr.,1." -,q^ensdsc.in explo,'a.on. \ e,eser, ce din Irp,.p,.,t;i-r;;;;;;#;'J,,:: rhemserve. .a,rs orurhonry ro which sr doni rh,nk i;;y ,; ""irir.i i"e"jri. ""llirl k do nor sufer). and . h conlrast we r.l.nt unjusrrnea Aemorions-or.srpr,l.to oDr om staru( r_inal). rcscnrment i, ".i." p,.;;i"; by;,#;,,":"i::':i'rurc.brcar,nB. nom.v,orauns. or .impry behavrir sc;n as .roui;iil; ;s1::';jseen as uDacceprabte offmces {2006. i23-4) p*pk *" p,i;[;. .;;;;"r*r;;qrh rcsenrncn, when provoked by any or the,e H., ;.,:;pl;; ,"iiia" ,i.,iiil l1(, AIie Matln&lan accents, urban development and in an amusing rcf€rence borrowed trom Alan Gibbard p@uliar haircuts I I Th€re is a rinsins familia.ity to any student of philosophy in this des.npdon of resentnmt, of course Il k rcminisceDr of Nietehc\ famous tre3rment of er(istential rcs€ntment, or /e$entimsr, ir Se'rion I oI The Genealogr oI Moruk (1967J. 12 Sce, lor exanple, Murphy and Hampton (1988). D'Arms and Jeobson (1993), walker (2006), Grhwold (2007). Brudholm (2008). Bibliography Brudholm, T. Q!n8\ Rese"hqt s vi ue: Jean Anet, and the Refutal to Forgiv, Philadelphia. PAr T€mple Unive6ity Prcss Butler, J. (1949 11126l) Fifteen Semons Preached at the Ror6 Chapter and a Dissertarion UNn the Nature of l/irlre, WR. Mauhcws ied.). Londonr C. Bell and Sons Ltd. D'Arms, J. and Jacobson, D (1993) 'The sisnificane of rccalcitrant emolion (or, anliquasi.iudgnentafism)', in A. Hatzimoysis (d.r, Philosoph! and the Enotions, Cambridgq CambridSe UniEBity Press. Darwall, S. (2006) The Secand-Pe\on Stahdpoinl: Motality, R5pect and Accou tarililx Cambndse, MA: Harvard University Pr€ss. - (2009)lsnith on honour and sell"rcspccl'. plenary address 1o 'The Philosophy ol Adam Shith', a conferen@ to commemo'ate the 250th anni\e$ary of The Theory of MoruI Sentimants, Oxford, January 2009; reprint d in this volume as 'Snith's ambivalence about honoui, pF 10G23. Duncatr'Jons, A. (195D au et s Motal Philosoph!, Londonr Pelican Books. Criswold, c.L. (1999) Adam Snirh and the l/ntue! o! ErlighEntu.n\ Camb;dsq Cambridse University Pss eo \n Fotsiwnes A Philosaphical Erpl,/.rlo,, Cambrld8e: Camb.idsc Unirersity Presi Habea J.G (199f) Forgiv?uess: A Philosophical Stutly. Lanham, MD: Roman and Lirtlefield. Harris, J. (2008)'Early rcc€ption of Hum€'s theory oljuslicc', u.published. Hieronymi, P. (2001) Articulating ar uncompmnising fotgiveness'. Philosoph, and Phenaneholosical Res.arch, 62: 529 55. Holmgren. M. (1993) 'Forsivcness and the intrinsic value ol p€rsons'. ,4n"rican Philosophicat Quafle t.30:14t 52. Jaggar, A. (2008) 'Love and knowlcdsq cmotion in fcminist episternolosy', in A. Bailey and C. Cuomo (edo, The Feminist Philosophy x.ader, Ncw York: Mccraw-Hill. Mocloskey, D (2008) Adam S ith, ihc last ofthe lormer virtxe ethicists', HirloD, o/ Polnical Ecano'nt 40 43 71. Murphy, J.G (2003) Genbs Eves: Faryiv ess ond its Linits, Oxford: Oxford Murphy, J.G. arld Hampton, J. (9a$ Fotsirw a Merc/, CambridSer Cambridse University Press" Ni.lzsche. F (1967) Tre Genqloer al Motab, tt^as. \'lalter Kaufmann. N€w York: Raphael, D.D. and Macfie, A.L. (19?6) lntroductjon to Adam Smiih, The Theor) oI Monl Setuinents. Otfotd Clarendon Press: Liberty Press imprint, 1982. Resehtment an l morul juclgmeht 11 Smith, A. (1976) The Theory oI Morct Scntimenrn D.D. Raphaet and A.L Mac6 (edt, Oxfor* Clarcndon Pre$i Liberty prcss imprinr, 1982. Strawson, P (2003)'Fr€dom ed rcsentmcnf, in G. wars o\ led.\, kee wi . Oxfoft Orford Uniwrsity Pr€ss wafter, M U. (2006) Mdat Repair: Recodouctins Moral Rctations after wrcngdoinl Cambridge: Cambndge University press. Wallacc. R.J. (1994) Reyohsibility and nrc Morul S?,ln?rrr. Cambridge, MA Haryard Unive6rly Prcsr